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RIGHT TO REPLY 
In his review of my book Poverty, Ethics and Justice, Tony Fitzpatrick makes three 
important criticisms against the book that cannot be left unchallenged. The first concerns my 
revision of the distinction between absolute and relative poverty. He implies that my revision 
is as imprecise as I judge the distinction between absolute and relative poverty to be. The 
second criticism concerns my use of the fact that many people are rationally inconsistent in 
the way they endorse moral values selfishly to their own benefit. He thinks to point out such 
a lack of moral integrity is “that whereas they might persuade us to change our practices they 
might also encourage us to revise our ideals”. In addition he judges that I use the fact of our 
accountability to our fellow citizens “to establish the nature of that accountability”, an 
“analytical shift” that Fitzpatrick believes “requires much more care”. The third criticism is 
that the core argument in the book “slides past a lot of relevant debates all too easily and 
quickly”. He senses a certain “casualness” in my work, suggesting that there is not “sufficient 
rigour” nor proper in depth discussions of the major philosophical theories dealing with 
issues of poverty. 
I challenge these three criticisms by showing that [1] my revision of the absolute-relative 
distinction can do much more than he suggests, [2] my core argument about moral 
obligations to eradicate poverty has a much larger scope than Fitzpatrick acknowledges, and 
[3] there should be room for different approaches to major ethical problems that allows for 
different intellectual designs and presentations in larger scale projects. 
Fitzpatrick’s first major criticism is that my revision of the distinction between absolute and 
relative poverty seems as imprecise as I judge that distinction to be. Let me briefly explain 
my revision and demonstrate why I think this definition is an improvement. In the book I 
revise the traditional distinction between absolute and relative poverty into a new distinction 
between extreme and intermediate poverty [Lötter 2011: 271]. I define poverty as a lack of 
economic capacities [both resources and competencies to fittingly use them] in humans that 
has two distinct effects, differing in degree. I use the words extreme and intermediate to 
indicate the degree of seriousness of a specific case of poverty in terms of the harmful 
consequences for the well-being of humans [Lötter 2011: 29]. Intermediate poverty is the 
first stage of poverty and extreme poverty is a further worsening of a person’s condition 
[Lötter 2011: 36]. People who suffer from extreme poverty thus also suffer fully from all the 
harms, effects, and consequences of intermediate poverty [Lötter 2011: 36]. The advantage of 
this distinction is that the focus is on the degree of harm involved in the two kinds of poverty, 
whilst in both cases there are universal elements embodied that make the definitions useful 
in any society. Both definitions nevertheless retain contextual elements as well that can only 
be specified meaningfully in terms of a particular society [Lötter 2011: 271]. 
Let me explain these two kinds of poverty in more detail. The first kind is “intermediate 
poverty”, the lesser of the two evils because the degree of harm involved is less. People 
suffering from intermediate poverty firstly do not have sufficient economic capacities to 
enable them to participate in the characteristic social activities judged to be constitutive of 
being human in their society [see Nussbaum (2011: 17 – 45) for a related, but different way of 
looking at these issues]. Note both the universal and contextual aspects of this part of the 
definition. The universal elements cluster around generic social activities that humans have 
engaged in throughout known history – all matters regularly described and measured by the 
human sciences. Classes of such activities include actions linked to governance of diverse 
aspects of the community’s shared life to establish a just social order, education to train and 
equip others to fulfil useful tasks, initiation ceremonies for welcoming new participants in 
diverse social practices, thanksgiving events for expressing gratitude for services rendered in 
smaller or larger contexts, celebration of significant events on smaller (family) and larger 
(society) scale, and entertainment to amuse and amaze others through expressing rare 
individual and team talents and skills. Although we find examples of virtually all these 
classes of actions in all human societies, the ways and means of expressing them differ from 
society to society, both in terms of comparisons between contemporary societies and 
comparisons between societies in the present and societies of the past.  
People suffering from intermediate poverty secondly do not have sufficient economic 
capacities to enable them to develop their unique human capacities in ways that other 
humans appreciate or might yet come to appreciate. The universal aspects in this part of the 
definition of intermediate poverty are in human potential for various kinds of activities, such 
as intellectual work, physical activity, artistic expression, manual labour, creativity and 
design, and so on. Within the context of a specific society, people are exposed to the 
possibilities available within that society to develop their own unique skills and talents [see 
Nussbaum (2011) and Sen (2009) for a similar approach couched in a different vocabulary 
and dissimilar theoretical framework]. People with talent in sport can only develop those 
talents in relation to the kind of sport available in their society, the facilities available, the 
coaches with expert knowledge for training, and the competitors that challenge them. In a 
more advanced, developed society with more resources some individuals are able to develop 
themselves better and have more opportunities to excel at some or other human activity.  
In addition to the loss of dignity caused by intermediate poverty, people suffering from 
extreme poverty face additional harm as well. Their lack of economic capacities is so great 
that they cannot provide for their most basic needs, i.e. they lack one or more of adequate 
nutrition, shelter, clothing, and medical care to such an extent that their health starts to 
suffer through specific conditions that result from deficient nutrition, shelter, clothing, or 
medical care [see the detailed empirical research done by the United Nations Development 
Programme (2013)]. Note again both the universal element in this part of the definition of 
poverty, as well as the contextual aspects – phenomena regularly depicted by the human 
sciences [see the new approach heralded by the OECD, that now aims to employ more 
nuanced, refined, and accurate measures of poverty to better reflect both material living 
conditions and the quality of human life. They thus measure income and wealth, jobs and 
earnings, housing, health status, work and life balance, education and skills, civic 
engagement and governance, social connections, environmental quality, personal security, 
and subjective well-being to provide more precise, wider spectrum profiles of poverty (see 
OECD 2011)]. Despite individual variation based on personal characteristics, all human 
beings will run into problems with their health if they lack nutrition, shelter, clothing, and 
medical care to a significant extent. The contextual element lies in the kinds of nutrition, 
shelter, clothing, and medical care available in a society and the cost thereof relative to what 
is available and its cost in other societies. 
I have two major problems with Fitzpatrick’s critique of my use of the rational inconsistency 
to challenge many non-poor people about they selfishly live their moral values. The one is 
that he fails to see how easily the charge of rational inconsistency can turn into a strong 
political challenge that poor people can direct at rationally inconsistent non-poor people. Le 
me explain. Note my formulation of this idea: “Suppose a person selfishly agrees to the 
protection and opportunities provided by graciously interpreted and benevolently specified 
sets of democratic values, norms of justice, conceptions of human rights, or universal moral 
principles respectful of human dignity, then that person must accept that a consistent 
application of these sets of moral values implies that poor people can claim similar 
protection and opportunities from them.” [Lötter 2011: 163]. Our point of difference about 
the value of pointing out rational inconsistency lies in the fact that I contend that poor 
people “can claim similar protection and opportunities” from those who inconsistently 
support shared moral values. Poor people can easily mobilise to turn a lack of rational 
consistency into demands for reasonable reciprocity. They, as citizens who feel done in, 
deprived, or cheated by fellow citizens taking that kind of attitude can simply engage in 
political campaigns to challenge them on their inconsistency. At this point the charge of 
rational inconsistency transforms into a demand for reasonable reciprocity. But this demand 
by poor people for an account why their poverty is not being addressed is not the only moral 
obligation that poor people face to eradicate poverty. The series of arguments through many 
chapters that demonstrate how a multitude of moral obligations arise to eradicate poverty as 
a result of our voluntary choices about our public moral values form the core argument of the 
book, one that I believe Fitzpatrick misread.  
Thus, the second major problem I have with Fitzpatrick’s reading of the moral obligations I 
propose we have to eradicate poverty is that he misreads the core argument of the book, as it 
is far more comprehensive than his reading allows. A large part of the book explains what 
poverty is and how its consequences harms human beings as individuals, families, 
communities, and societies.  
What I show in the book is how our various moral obligations to eradicate poverty can be 
portrayed from different angles. Full simultaneous implementation of all core moral values 
combined can lead to an overhaul of institutions and a rethink of every individual’s role in 
the struggle against poverty [Lötter 2011: 279]. The central point of the book thus is that all 
our moral values urge us to assume a strong moral obligation to eradicate poverty and to 
prevent it from recurring [Lötter 2011: 280]. Thus, the ultimate challenge for humans is to 
empower ourselves to deal with poverty fittingly by properly understanding the value and 
power of collective human action for addressing the seemingly intractable problems of 
poverty that often persist through generations [Lötter 2011: 280]. 
In the book this argument for moral obligations to eradicate poverty is a multi-layered one 
that progresses through different phases to portray our moral obligations to eradicate 
poverty from different angles. Most of them build on the foundation that assigns dignity to 
every human. A reconstruction of my overall argument based on these different angles reads 
as follows: 
1. Enlightened self-interest. I point out that an individual’s deep dependence and reliance 
on many different networks of people who enable or facilitate what the individual can do 
creates moral obligations, albeit self-interested ones.  
2. Impact on others. Throughout the book I highlight that individual humans must justify 
why we allow the negative impact of our words and deeds and their consequences to 
negatively influence other people’s lives [Lötter 2011: 17]. 
3. Generally accepted moral values. In chapters four and five I present detailed analyses of 
the effects of poverty on poor people to demonstrate how these effects contravenes several 
generally accepted moral principles. For example, I argue in Chapter 4 that violations of 
human dignity are serious matters that must be addressed and I assume as a general moral 
principle that “we morally reject any unnecessary, preventable suffering to the bodies and 
health of human beings” [Lötter 2011: 61]. The effects of poverty cause both these 
consequences in people’s lives and thus what poor people experience flies in the face of what 
we expect our moral values to prevent. 
4. Reasonable reciprocity. I argue that we must be willing to give an account in face-to-face 
situations by answering “why some non-poor citizens can command massive shares of 
societal resources and consequently deplete available means that could have enabled 
suffering people in inhuman circumstances to have minimally decent lives” [Lötter 2011: 175. 
See also Lötter 2011: 187].   
5. Core values underlying democratic institutions. I set up a detailed argument to 
demonstrate how the core democratic values of liberty, equality and solidarity require that 
governmental institutions show equal concern to protect the fundamental interests of every 
citizen. I judge them as the strongest instruments we have for protecting our fundamental 
interests that therefore can assist us best in the struggle to eradicate poverty that diminish 
and destroy people’s lives.  
6. Ideas of justice as best practice poverty prevention. In chapter nine I argue that a 
conception of justice has two major functions, i.e. to prevent harm to humans and to 
establish conditions for humans to live flourishing individual and shared lives worthy of 
being human. I demonstrate that a liberal-egalitarian conception of justice has the ability to 
prevent all forms of poverty and could effectively be employed to guide the complete 
eradication of existing poverty.  
7. Fundamental goals of political associations. In chapter eleven I argue by means of a 
thought experiment that contemporary citizens will collectively choose five goals to guide the 
functioning of all public governance institutions [see Lötter 2011: 249]. All these goals have a 
distinct moral element as they jointly function as a kind of highest level social contract of 
humans with one another about the nature and functions of our collective governance of 
each other, a “contract” that we revisit and renegotiate according to set procedures as times 
goes by [see Lötter 2011: 227].  
8. Our collective responsibility for the social order. I express another perspective on our 
moral obligations for the differential effects public institutions and policies have on people 
by looking at the power we humans have to collectively determine the nature of our shared 
social structure [Lötter 2011: 212]. The various tenacious manifestations of poverty require 
teamwork by a whole society and thus poverty can best be dealt with through collective 
human action to establish a just social order rather than individual charitable efforts on their 
own [Lötter 2011: 210, 211].  
Others, such as Nancy Fraser [2009] and the United Nations Development Programme 
[2013: 4-9, 36-37], have made similar points like these ones of mine about the need for a 
comprehensive framework for the eradication of poverty built on a theory of justice. Such 
suggested frameworks contain multipronged strategies at all levels by everyone involved, 
giving priority to the voices of poor people to guide a multi-faceted global struggle (see also 
O’Neill 2008: 152-153; Collier 2008: xi, and Sobhan 2010: 1-12). These frameworks support 
the global perspectives on poverty eradication from the major international organizations 
working in this field, like the World Bank, UNDP and the OECD.  
9. Demands of compensatory justice. Many instances of poverty result from some kind of 
injustice. In those cases the people who committed the injustice incur moral obligations to 
eradicate the resultant poverty. 
10. Other special moral obligations. Specific circumstances, events, or actions can also 
generate moral obligations to eradicate poverty.  
Fitzpatrick’s third major criticism is that I seemingly do not have sufficient in depth 
discussions of the literature. Although I understand and appreciate the value of discussing 
state of the art philosophical theories in depth and engaging them directly, that is not the 
only – or even the best - way to write a book on an extremely complex moral problem like 
poverty. I chose to develop a theory that views poverty as a complex moral phenomenon by 
engaging social science research results as the primary evidence my theory has to explain.  
Widdows [2011: 9–10] characterises global ethics as “fundamentally multidisciplinary” and 
thus it requires “expertise from across the spectrum”. Leading global ethicists immerse 
themselves in “political theory and empirical analysis” with the aim to “influence practice 
and policy”. In these ways the global ethicists want to “contribute to creating global relations 
that are more just” so as to reduce and eradicate “global injustice and suffering” [Widdows 
2011: 10]. Granted my flawed attempt at following this kind of approach, nevertheless it 
seems one legitimate way of doing ethics when confronted with a complex issue like poverty 
that has such a major global footprint? 
Taking this kind of approach does in no way imply that I did not take philosophical theories 
seriously, as the philosophical literature on justice and sociological literature on poverty 
form the horizons of my thought and the sources of my ideas. There are numerous references 
to standard works in the literature that show they form the context and background for my 
own theory. However, I still think that a book that presents a unique look at the fine detail of 
poverty from a range of moral perspectives and offers an explanatory theory that includes 
moral guidance for a wide range of moral agents on their responsibility to eradicate poverty 
has value as an alternative approach. 
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